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Northern Ireland and South Africa:
"Hope and History at a Crossroads"
Padraig O'Malley
Your truth that lacks the warmth of lies,
the ability to compromise.
John Hewitt
Whenever things threatened to fall apart during our negotiations - and they did on many
occasions - we would stand back and remind ourselves that if negotiations broke down the
outcome would be a blood bath of unimaginable proportions, and that after the blood bath we
would have to sit down again and negotiate with each other. The thought always sobered us up,
and we persisted, despite many setbacks.
President Nelson Mandala
Arniston, South Africa
29 May 1997

South African President Mandela addressed his words to the leaders of political
parties in Northern Ireland, including David Trimble and Martin McGuinness, at
De Hoop, a secured conference facility in Arniston, a small town in the Western
Cape.
The conference was dubbed the De Hoop lndaba - lndaba is the Zulu word for
a "meeting of the minds." The event, which was hosted by the South African
government, brought together the chief negotiators from all parties .in Northern
Ireland -the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),
the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein (SF), the Women's Coalition (WC), the Ulster
Democratic Party (UDP), the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Labour
Party (LP), for a three-day private meeting with the people from all parties in
South Africa who had negotiated the historic settlement in November 1993 that
ended white minority rule, installed a nonracial transitional government, opened
the way to South Africa's first nonracial election in April 1994, and the
subsequent Government of National Unity (GNU). 1
Today, President Nelson's words still resonate. Indeed, the constant refrain of
the parties supporting the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in the run-up to the
referendum that endorsed the agreement was of a similar nature: If not the
agreement, what is the alternative? A question that helped to sober up the
electorate provided them with food for thought after thirty years of conflict and
was certainly a factor in its decision to vote for the historic compromise. Eighteen
months later, winding up his review of the agreement necessitated by the
impasse over the formation of a power-sharing Executive that would include Sinn
Fein, the political wing of the IRA, and the decommissioning of arms by the IRA,
Senator George Mitchell addressed the assembled media and warned that "even
the dogs in the street knew that without a power-sharing Executive in place,
1

there would be no decommissioning." When David Trimble had to ask his 858
colleagues on the Ulster Unionist Council who constitute the ruling body of the
UUP to endorse his willingness to give Mitchell's recommendations a chance,
he, too, posed the question to them in the same vein. And when he had to face
them again in February 2000, his colleagues had to address this one unchanging
reality.

NORTHERN IRELAND AND SOUTH AFRICA:
COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

Comparisons between the conflicts in South Africa and Northern Ireland should
not be lightly made. However, the two share similarities that shed light on the
nature of the conflict in each. The conflicts both in Northern Ireland and in South
Africa have much in common, but to compare or contrast them directly without
each being put in the context of its own history would be misleading and
specious.
This much can be said. Both conflicts share common structural characteristics
typical of divided societies. The dominant community (Afrikaners in South Africa,
Protestants in Northern Ireland) came from settler populations, and the
subordinate community (blacks in South Africa, Catholics in Northern Ireland)
was indigenous. In both cases, the dominant community asserted an equal claim
to the land.
Afrikaners trace their roots to a trading post their forebears established on the
Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Protestants trace theirs to the plantation of Ulster in
1607. In neither case is there a "mother'' country to which the designated "settler"
population can return, nor would the designated "mother'' countries regard
themselves as such.
Many divided society conflicts have roots in the indigenous/settler dichotomy,
especially where the settlers disposed of the indigenous as the ruling elite, but
they are in themselves insufficient explications of the root causes of why conflict
emerges in some multiethnic societies and why it does not in others.
There is no literature that comprehensively documents why some conflicts are
more amenable to settlement - not resolution - than others. Each beats to the
rhythms of its own contradictory impulses, hostage to myth and history,
distortions of reality, imprisoned in misrepresentation, warped perceptions, and
insatiable demands for revenge that are the legacy one generation bequeaths to
the next. In some, the long duration of the conflicts leads to" the evolution of
social mechanisms to regulate and control the relationships [between the parties
in conflict], and unable either to remove each other and unwilling to assimilate,
they gradually evolved forms of relationships which regulated rather than
resolved their antagonisms."2
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In Northern Ireland, such social controls evolved. Acceptable levels of political
instability became the norm, thus reducing the pressure on the politicians and
their party masters to engage in the intense dialogue that is inevitably necessary
to break historical logjams.
In South Africa, apartheid mandated the forms of relationships that existed
between blacks and whites. When apartheid began to crumble, the absence of
political and social space to create new forms of relationships, except among
certain elements of the elite, widened the divide between blacks and whites,
encouraging the liberation movements to make the townships ungovernable.
When it became increasingly clear that the government no longer had the
stomach to pay them the price control the townships exacted, given its own
uncertainties - and divisions - as to the way forward. These uncertainties were
reinforced by the government's reluctant conclusions in the mid-eighties that
apartheid was no longer a viable proposition nor one that could be propped up
indefinitely by made-to-order reforms.
Yet, it remained unsure with what to replace apartheid, and unwilling- or unable
-to contemplate the ramifications of the inevitable - a universal franchise and
a total dismantling of the apartheid apparatus; in short, the surrender of power.
Nevertheless, while the social controls to regulate the conflict were deteriorating
at an exponential rate, they did not collapse, thus providing the leeway for the
risks both the ANC and the National Party (NP) government had to confront in
their respective communities in order to convince their constituencies that neither
was about to sell them out in negotiations.
Certainly, the degree to which indigenous and settler populations intermix, the
prevalence of intermarriage, the level of social integration, the degree to which
religious or ethnic affiliations become purveyors of the perceived threats of
difference rather than the perceived enrichments of diversity and the salience of
dispossession as one group's historical starting point contribute enormously to
political and socioeconomic imbalances. These eventually express themselves in
conflict when satisfactory forms of equilibrium among competing interests
become impossible to calibrate.
On the other hand, the "narcissism of small differences," which postulates that
the more objectively alike opposing groups are, the more they magnify their
pseudo differences is a more satisfying theoretical model to explore. In South
Africa, marginal whites, especially Afrikaners in the lower classes who were part
of the apartheid government's "welfare state" for its own Oob reservation for
whites only, for instance)- were far more opposed to reforms that would give
more opportunities to blacks than better-off whites, since they would be far more
likely to feel the consequences. 3 In Northern Ireland, support for militant
Loyalism flourished in the Protestant working classes, also job beneficiaries of
Protestant hegemony, who felt more threatened by changes that would provide
more opportunities for Catholics than their middle- and upper-class compatriots.
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In South Africa the militant white right drew its support from the ranks of the less
well-off Afrikaner working class; in Northern Ireland, the Protestant paramilitary
organizations drew their members from the less well-off Protestant working
class. 4
Thus, class differences exacerbate racial and ethnic affinities, and the
consequences of radical change that would alter the balance of power among
competing classes played an underreported, often subliminal role during
negotiations in both conflicts. The elite have a high,ly developed propensity for
protecting their own interests. 5
In other respects, demography has shaped the contours of the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and South Africa. In South Africa, the 17 percent minority white
population dominated the black population; in Northern Ireland, at least until the
British government abolished the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972, the 65
percent Protestant population dominated Catholics. In South Africa the rate of
growth of the black population greatly exceeds that of the white population, while
in Northern Ireland the Catholic proportion of the population has been steadily
increasing.
As a result, in South Africa, whites were being forced to face a situation in which
their numbers alone would be insufficient to either ensure their capacity to
maintain control of state institutions or to contain black insurrection. In Northern
Ireland, the size of the Catholic minority continued to ensure that Protestant rule
would be immobilized if Catholics were to withdraw their consent to the modes of
governance. In both cases, the dominant group saw itself as being superior to
the other- even marginal members of superior groups derive status from
belonging to their particular group.
When that marginal status is threatened, they react, often violently, to protect
their positions. Hence, in Northern Ireland, the fears of right-wing working-class
Protestants who support Loyalist paramilitaries and, in South Africa the fears of
marginal whites who flocked to the Conservative Party and militant right -wing
organizations like the AWB. One of the less heeded lessons of history is that the
"outs" in the "in" groups always want to preserve the status quo.
But as important, as a result of the manner in which both governments tried to
"manage" their conflicts, a number of perceptions common to both developed.
Both governments tried to promote allegiance to the state on the basis of law
rather than on the consent of the governed. Both governments pursued policies
that supplemented military measures to combat political terrorism by increasing
use of the judicial process, and both ended up subverting the judicial process.
And because both governments went out of their way to present the problem of
violence as one of law and order, of internal security or national security,
Catholics and blacks alike lost faith in the police, the whole paraphernalia of the
legal and judicial systems, and therefore in the states themselves. The
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perception of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland and the black
community in South Africa was that the law was an instrument of the state's
security and political policies rather than of justice.
Hence two antithetical perceptions of justice prevailed in each place. Northern
Ireland Catholics and South African blacks regarded the administration of justice
as being unfair; they saw themselves as being "policed" by the dominant
Protestant and white communities, respectively; in each the police were the
"enemy." Both argued that their state's emergency powers were aimed almost
exclusively against them; they saw that those who were charged with upholding
the law broke it routinely and were not held accountable for their actions.
South African whites and Ulster Protestants saw the reverse: The Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (respectively, the military wings
of Sinn Fein and the ANC) were engaging in terrorist campaigns with the
objective of overthrowing the state; both South African whites and Ulster
Protestants feared being "swamped" or "absorbed" -whites in a South Africa
ruled by an overwhelming black majority; Protestants in a united Ireland ruled by
an overwhelming Catholic majority. Both regarded the security forces as too
lenient with paramilitary groups; both argued that emergency laws were not
sufficiently stringent and not enforced with sufficient vigor. Both saw Catholic and
black unwillingness to support the police as indicative of support for the
advocates of violence.
There are, of course, other significant differences, too, between both conflicts.
One involves the question of sovereignty. Northern Ireland is part of the United
Kingdom. However, Irish governments and the Irish constitution always asserted
that Northern Ireland was a part of Ireland's national territory. No Irish
government paid more than lip service to the claim, and no British government
paid any attention to it. But in Northern Ireland, where ethnic affiliation was the
defining characteristic of the conflict, the Irish constitutional claim was a faultline.6 Competing claims to different national identities are at the core of the
conflict.
In South Africa, sovereignty, too, played a role in the conflict, but with a
significant difference. At one level, the conflict centered on the majority of the
citizens of South Africa demanding the right to exercise their prerogatives as
citizens of South Africa, especially the right to vote. Until the mid-1980s, only
whites were statutorily citizens; blacks were citizens of the ethnic homelands the
white regime carved out for them. When that policy was revoked in 1986, it was
not accompanied by the dismantling of apartheid and the all-encompassing
range of laws that were flagrant violations of the human rights of the black
community.
Hence, the crisis of legitimacy in South Africa that separated the protagonists. All
South Africans -blacks (African, Coloured, and Indian) and whites share a
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common identity- they regard themselves as South Africans. However, for
whites the basis for identity was exclusiveness - a whites-only attribute.
Blacks were denied the franchise in South Africa because whites had designated
them as citizens of their respective homelands, not as citizens of South Africa.
Thus, what black liberation movements in South Africa sought was universal
suffrage- one person, one vote- the recognition of their identity as South
Africans, not as citizens of white-created ethnic homelands. For blacks the basis
for identity was inclusiveness. However, universal suffrage would ensure that the
black majority would rule the country, erasing the privileges and power of the
ruling white minority. In short, blacks aspired to the rule of the majority and the
white minority was prepared to go to any lengths to prevent a black takeover.
Once whites acknowledged that all South Africans, regardless of color, were
citizens of South Africa, they were faced with the dilemma of how to reconcile
that belief with its corollary - the concomitant rights of blacks to full political
rights - and simultaneously trying to prevent the death knell of white
dominance.
But what defined the crucial differences between the two conflicts were the
measures that the dominant communities adopted to preserve their power and
privilege. In South Africa, the Afrikaner state implemented racial policies of
apartheid and separation with methodical and brutal force. They made blacks
nonpersons in their own country, forcing the resettlement of millions, destroying
family life and undermining its social fabric, requiring them to live in
underserviced and overpopulated townships or in white demarcated
"Bantustans." Blacks were totally disenfranchised and denied any expression of
their aspirations. Indeed, Afrikaners went one step further. They defined black
aspirations, provided the "homelands" in which blacks could achieve them, and
forcibly moved millions into these homelands so that they might enjoy the
benefits of their "heritage"-as defined by whites.
But neither the level of subordination Catholics had to endure nor the harshness
of the dominant regime ever reached the level of repression that the Afrikaner
regime imposed in South Africa. To say, therefore, that the situations of South
African blacks and Northern Ireland Catholics were similar is to trivialize the
enormous suffering South African blacks endured. Apartheid was evil,
condemned by the United Nations as "a crime against humanity." The kinds of
majority domination practiced and enforced by Protestants in Northern Ireland
were repulsive and wrong but hardly evil. Moreover, most of the measures of
Protestant ascendancy were alleviated after the British government abolished
the Ulster parliament and introduced Direct Rule in 1972.
While there are common elements to the inequities both societies face as a
result of the legacies of past discrimination, injustices, and being deliberately
disadvantaged - either through legislative measures or willful action on the part
of the dominant group - the social and economic imbalances between Catholics
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and Protestants in Northern Ireland are relatively insignificant compared with the
imbalances between blacks and whites in South Africa. Moreover, the emphasis
put on redressing these injustices will be strikingly different. Socioeconomic
imbalances in Northern Ireland will be addressed in the context of similar
imbalances existing in other parts of the UK. In South Africa, the ANC, with its
huge base of popular support, is attempting to restructure the "molecular''
composition of society itself, to bring about a total transformation that will reach
into every echelon of society through legislative means and within the broad
boundaries of its new constitution.
In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, although many of the institutions that are
shaping the South African transformation are provided for in the GFA- a Bill of
Rights, Equality, Gender, and Human Rights commissions, and so on -their
remits do not envisage societal restructuring and they do not have the breadth of
powers of parallel institutions in South Africa.
Thus, while the purpose of negotiations in both societies was to produce a
settlement which would ensure that all people were treated with "parity of
esteem," the measures necessary to ensure parity will require a fundamental
restructuring of South Africa on a scale that is not envisioned in the Northern
Ireland settlement.
Another fundamental difference: the moral difference. The ANC represented the
great majority of blacks and was engaged in a genuine war of national liberation
that would give its people the voting franchise they were denied and the right to
elect a government of their own choosing. The ANC resorted to an armed
struggle only as a measure of last resort when the government refused to
engage in discussions on measures to resolve any issue. 7 The ANC fought a just
war, although the means it used to pursue a just aim were not always
themselves just. 8
The IRA, on the other hand, was not fighting a war of national liberation, did not
enjoy widespread support in Northern Ireland and next to none in the South. At
best, the IRA represented a minority (of nationalists) of a minority (republicans)
of a minority (physical force hard-liners) in Northern Ireland, and was even more
unrepresentative of the South's political proclivities. 9
So while the ANCs met the criteria for a just war, the IRAs did not, and the IRA
used innumerable occasions to employ unjust means in the pursuit of its unjust
war. Any attempt on the part of militant republicans to equate the IRA actions
with the actions of Umkhonto we Sizwe (M K) is both politically and morally
indefensible. The former lacked political legitimacy and moral standing; the latter
had both. Indeed, Nationalists' demands that erupted into mass confrontations
between Catholics and Protestants in the late 1960s had been met by the British
government. 10 In this sense there was never any moral equivalence between the
two conflicts.
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Questions of identity are invariably pulled out of the conflict-resolution hat to
explain conflict in deeply divided societies. They are important to take into
account, but at the root of conflict is fear: the fear the dominant class has of the
consequences of change, whether it involves a loss of power, status, absorption
by another culture, ethos, tradition, or whatever the values and norms and
particular characteristics the dominant tradition associate as being essential to its
own survival.
In Northern Ireland, which has been part of the UK since the partition of Ireland
in 1921, the conflict is between two competing identities and national aspirations.
Of the population of approximately 1.5 million, 40 percent are Catholics, most of
whom regard themselves as Irish and aspire to become part of the rest of
Ireland, which is 95 percent Catholic.
The majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland have consistently made it clear that
they wanted to pursue the aspiration to Irish unity in a peaceful manner while
being able to express their lrishness and participate on the basis of equality in
the government in Northern Ireland. Hence their calls for power sharing in
Northern Ireland and some institutional expression of their relationship with the
rest of Ireland- the Irish Dimension.
The 60 percent of the population who are Protestants regard themselves as
British and want to remain part of the UK. Their most profound fear is that the
two governments -the British and the Irish -will somehow collude to "deliver''
them into a united Ireland where they would be culturally and religiously
absorbed and constitute a minority of 20 percent. The religious component of
their fears cannot be overstressed. 11
Most white South Africans had been "brainwashed" into believing that the South
African Communist Party (SACP), was the vanguard of Soviet expansionism into
Southern Africa, the "crown jewel" of its rapacious intentions. The threat of the
Total Onslaught from atheistic Communism became ingrained in the white
psyche. 12 The SACP, the subversive agent of the Soviets, was using the ANC as
a front to overthrow the South African government and impose a communist
regime.
The analogy with Protestant fears in Northern Ireland that they will somehow be
coerced into a united Ireland is striking, all the more so because it, too, is
irrational, the product of perceived rather than actual threat. They fear being
subjected to the rule of a Catholic state that takes its marching orders from
Rome. A significant number of Democratic Unionist Party supporters are
members of lan Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church or other right-wing
Protestant sects. They fear negotiations, viewing them as instruments that are
carefully calibrated to ensure that one day they will wake up to find themselves
part and parcel of an all-Ireland state. They fear that if such a situation were to
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arise, they would be absorbed into and dominated by the larger Catholic culture,
and that religious and cultural absorption would inevitability lead to extinction.
Ethnic cleansing of a different kind. 13
In South Africa since the mid-eighties, the government had slowly come to the
conclusion that its security apparatus, despite the magnitude of the resources at
its disposal, could not "defeat" the liberation movement. The ANC had slowly
come to the conclusion that the armed struggle and the internal campaign to
make the country "ungovernable" could not "defeat" the government. Their
trajectories were about to intersect. 14
Again, in Northern Ireland, the situation was more complicated.
Only when Sinn Fein and the IRA were brought to the point where they
understood that even though the British could not defeat the IRA they could
contain it; that the IRA could not militarily defeat the British; that the British were
not about to "withdraw" from Northern Ireland; that Northern Ireland would
remain part of the UK as long as that was the wish of a majority of the people
there; that an all-Ireland state was not in the offing unless the Catholic
community could convince the Protestant community that its future lay in its
being part of some all-Ireland arrangement rather than a peripheral part of
Britain; that that might never happen and would never happen if the IRA
continued to resort to violence; that the Protestants of Northern Ireland had the
right to say no to a united Ireland; that the IRA's targeting of members of the
RUG and the UDR as part of the British "killing" machine had embittered the
Protestant community to the point where reconciliation would take a long time to
achieve, that a united Ireland was not on the cards now, in the foreseeable
future, or perhaps ever, could the first traces of a peace process emerge. 15
The "enemy" with which they would have to negotiate was not the British
government but the representatives of the Protestant community in Northern
Ireland --the UUP, DUP, PUP, and UDP. If they were ever to cut a deal, these
were the stakeholders with whom they would have to cut the deal.
For its part, the Protestant community had to rethink some of its own most
sacred shibboleths: that rule by the majority in a deeply divided society was not
democratic since the dominant community would always be in a position to
impose its will on the minority community; that it would have to accept
entrenched power sharing between the two communities, providing for parity of
esteem between their respective traditions, cultures, political aspirations, and
senses of national identity; that its right to say no to a united Ireland was
counterbalanced by the right of Catholics to aspire to one; that special
relationships existed between the two parts of Ireland that had to be
accommodated in an institutional framework; that the right of Catholics to
express their lrishness had to be on an equal footing with the right of Protestants
to express their Britishness.
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Only when both sides had come to similar conclusions regarding the nature of
the matters that had to be negotiated did a basis for negotiations exist. Both
sides had legitimate rights and interests to protect; both had grievances that had
to be addressed; neither "owned" victimhood, and neither could expect to
achieve through a process of negotiations all that they had hoped for or aspired
to.
Only when both could put the basis for a settlement in the perspective of what
they had managed to achieve on their own behalf and what they had managed
to preclude the other from achieving could there be actual, if gradual, "drift"
towards agreement.

THE ARNISTON INDABA

The purpose of the Arniston conference was not to proscribe but for the South
Africans to describe, share, bear witness, as it were, to their own experience that
even in the most intractable of conflicts there are common denominators to the
processes that must be created, the structures that must be put in place, the
procedural principles that must be followed, the compromises that must be
assented to, the trade-offs that must be condoned, and above all the trust that
must be cultivated and blossom before negotiations can come to fruition, and a
settlement, no doubt as flawed as the flawed individuals who put its fragile parts
together, is agreed.
The most salient of these common denominators the South Africans identified for
the Northern Irish were:
•

There should be transparency and openness in the negotiating process. To
whatever extent is possible, all stakeholders- business, unions, other
institutional organs of civil society, and the constituencies of the protagonists
should be made part of the process. On no account should an impression be
given that deals are being done behind closed doors.

•

On the other hand, some deals must be done in confidence - not in secret.
Confidentiality means that parties in bilateral or multilateral talks reach
agreements that are not revealed at the time they are arrived at. But these
agreements are ultimately part of the settlement "package" that is represented
to the parties' constituents for their endorsement. Secret deals, on the other
hand, are not put in the public domain, are only revealed in time, if at all, after
a settlement is agreed but for which the public's endorsement is never sought.
In the end, secret deals undermine negotiated settlements, especially when
each party's constituencies are fearful that their interests may be bargained
away.
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A secret deal on a particular issue, once it is "sprung" on an unsuspecting
public which may be accommodating itself to the new set of negotiated realities
immediately raises questions across all· divides regarding what other secret
deals have been cut and still remain unknown to them. There are immediate
outcries of concern. Whatever fears on all sides the settlement seemed to
have mollified begin to resurface, but with even greater intensity, and the
whole settlement begins to unravel.
In Northern Ireland, British Prime Minister Tony Blair skirted with the difference
in the small hours of the morning of Good Friday 1998, when in response to
being informed by David Trimble and other senior members of the UUP that
they could not sell the Agreement to their colleagues because of the
Agreement's language on decommissioning, reached for his pen and gave the
Unionists what they wanted-- a reassurance that decommissioning would
have to begin before the Executive was formed. If the price for an agreement
was a letter of reassurance on decommissioning -- not made available to the
other parties at this critical negotiating point -- Blair was prepared to pay the
price, convinced that in the end he could square the circle. In his letter of
"reassurance" to Trimble, Blair said: "In our view the effect of the
decommissioning section of the agreement, with decommissioning schemes
coming into effect in June[1998], is that the process of decommissioning
should begin straight away. 1116
That letter allowed Trimble to sell the GFA agreement to a majority in his party,
but did not engender unanimity of support. It insured his leadership of the
UUP, but not his command of it.
• A related requirement: There must be no "fudge" factors. Fudge factors don't
paper differences; they dry in cement. One can tear up paper; cement you
must bore through. When the cement has never hardened, it becomes
impossible to bore. The language on decommissioning in the GFA is an
indescribable mish-mash of ambiguity, defensible multi-interpretations;
classical avoidance that led to its own ineluctable consequences - the
impasse that resulted was entirely predictable. Like most complex issues
written in fudge, the fudge turned to mush. When Sinn Fein insisted that the
agreement does not call for decommissioning on the part of the IRA as the
price for its "admission" to the Executive, it is perfectly correct since its frame
of reference is the agreement itself. And when the UUP insists that the
agreement calls for prior, or at the very least parallel decommissioning on the
part of the IRA, it, too, is perfectly correct since its frame of reference was the
agreement plus the side letter of reassurance from Blair.
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The South African Constitution that emerged out of the Multi-party Negotiating
Process (MPNP) and the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly is a model
of a document whose every "i" had been dotted and every "t" had been
crossed.
•

Confidential talks/agreements are necessary because in a transparent
environment, the Heisenburg principle - the principle that the nature of an
event being observed changes by virtue of the observation itself- becomes an
integral part of the process itself. Thus, all transparent negotiations become
hostage to the manner in which they are reported in the media, and thus to a
propensity to negotiate sensitive issues through the media. Each party tries to
put its own particular "spin" on matters, issues are reported in isolation from
one another and without context. Agreement on a particular issue may be
reported, which might make it appear that one party was making a major
concession without any reciprocal concession on the part of the other,
inevitably the context that the agreement is contingent on another set of
arrangements in different strands of the negotiations. If particulars of a
settlement are examined in isolation from one another, they will look very
different and convey entirely different sets of implications than when they are
examined as their all being part of the one package where the whole is greater
than the sum of the particulars.

•

Progress comes only when negotiating parties team to start trusting each
other. Trust is a learned behavior. When one party addresses another,
especially in a bilateral, it must do so with particular sensitivity to the other
party's politics and the difficulties it may be having with its own community- or
even within the party's own ranks.

•

Parties must put themselves in the shoes of their protagonists. They must
help their protagonists to bring their communities with them. In the end,
successful negotiations are not so much about bringing your community along
with you, as helping your protagonists bring their communities along with them.
Respect for the others' positions is germane to the whole process. The ANC
and the South African Government (SAG) thought they learned this at a
relatively early stage in the process. They hadn't. Mistaken preconceptions on
the part of both, only "corrected" after the protracted "back channel"
negotiations that led to the Record of Understanding. The ANC had to learn
that while it was going to become the party of government, the manner in
which it went about achieving this was more important than the fact that it
would. The SAG had to learn the subtle fault-lines between the junior partner
in a power sharing government and the surrender of power. In Northern
Ireland, it took the parties that really had to learn to do so- the UUP and Sinn
Fein- a lot longer to get to that point of understanding. Indeed, they both had
put their signatures to the GFA before they had done so, and it took them the
better part of 18 months to reach that pivotal fulcrum of reluctant trust that
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made the formation of the power-sharing government the agreement called for
possible. But at that point, reluctant trust was not sufficient, and the collapse
of the arrangements agreed was for all intents and purposes a foregone
inevitability.
•

The level of trust that develops among negotiators is a function of their ability
to communicate outside of the formal settings of negotiating structures at
crucial points. This facilitates the alchemy of interpersonal relations, creates
empathy with the situations counterparts face -- not as negotiators but as
human beings with families and community who are trying their best to grapple
with problems not dissimilar from your own, and coming up against the same
kind of naysayers, you are among those on whose behalf you are negotiating.
The discovery of common interests- music, books, sports, similar hobbies,
childr~n and the problems you have with them, the worries they unwittingly
give you, the difficulties they have J:o deal with and the fact that their futures
rest in the decisions you mutually take humanize the negotiating process and
create bonds that go beyond the bonds that protracted negotiations
themselves create.

•

If political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust and respect, tolerance of
others, and a willingness to compromise must exist at all levels. In this regard,
where there is a transparent absence of trust on each side of the divide, due in
part to ingrained cultural differences with regard to language and processsome of which have their origins in competing claims to legitimacy that
developed over the centuries - a negotiating process that facilitates
confidence building actions is more likely to succeed than one that sets up a
situation more like a poker table than a negotiating table.

•

Party leaders should not act as their party's chief negotiator. Their function is
to appoint negotiators who act on their behalf. Negotiators are given a
mandate by their parties. It is the function of negotiators to negotiate away
their mandates in their quest for compromise and accommodation. It is the
function of party leaders to "sell" their negotiators' compromises to their parties
and constituents. It is also the function of the party leader to replace
negotiators who fail to present the party's mandate in the most propitious light.
If party leaders act as their own chief negotiators, this may prove to be an
exceedingly difficult chore.

•

At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent risk of compromise;
indeed, compromise is the essential ingredient of negotiations, without which
there can be no negotiations. Each compromise is a building block. As parties
grow to trust each other and move from one compromise to the next, with
concessions, though difficult, being made on all sides, every party becomes
invested in the process, each develops a stake in seeing the other succeed, a
sum of mutual investments develops, which provides the cushion when it
comes to the crunch issues.
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•

The concept of "sufficient consensus" rather than being defined in an
arithmetical way should be defined more flexibly as that level of consensus that
allows the process to move on to the next stage and does not result in the
process breaking down. In South Africa this meant that without the agreement
of both the ANC and the SAG on a particular issue, the issue remained
unresolved, irrespective of where other parties stood. While their agreement
would be "courted" it was no longer necessary for the process to move ahead.
In Northern Ireland, what began as a two-some between the UUP and the
SDLP, became a three-some once Sinn Fein joined the process, especially
since the SDLP would not side with the UUP against Sinn Fein. This
"triangulation" of what constituted "sufficient consensus" complicated the
process, allowing Sinn Fein to exercise a degree of influence out of proportion
to its numbers, an influence that was directly attributable to its "influence with"
the IRA, which, to complicate matters further, was not a party to the
negotiations, but rather the ghost of things to come should matters come to a
grinding halt. This reality made the Irish peace process less symmetrical than
the South African process. Hence, the asymmetrical problems that have arisen
out of both.

•

Time tables are important, but they should not be overriding. They
concentrate minds and force participants to meet deadlines encouraging
compromise, especially when progress has been made on a number of fronts,
or risking the loss of progress made up to that point. However, compromises
"forced" on parties in order to meet arbitrarily set deadlines can create
resentments that will find ways of expressing themselves that will be disruptive
at some later stage. Coerced compromises are not real compromises. In the
end they create the kind of backlash they were intended to avoid.

•

All parties must feel an equal ownership in the process. They must regard
the process as being theirs, the result of their deliberations and agreements,
that governments are parties to the process, not the owners of it. Negotiations
in South Africa took place in the turmoil of escalating violence. The Technical
Executive Committee (TEC) established by the November 1993 settlement
leveled the playing field; its inclusiveness did not obfuscate the obvious: the
tacit acknowledgment on the part of all that without the ANC and the NP
government being "on side" sufficient consensus on the way forward simply
didn't exist.
In Northern Ireland, violence, but more especially the threat of an escalation in
the scale and frequency of sectarian violence provided the concentration of
political will in London to put Northern Ireland on the political front-burner
rather than leave it on the back-burner where it had languished in political
isolation, except for the few occasions when events, usually some particularly
atrocious action by the IRA, it be moved up a burner or two.
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Their initiatives, however, were always seriously hampered in one regard.
Invariably they were government-driven. As a result the Northern Ireland
parties did not invest themselves fully in the process and were more intent on
proving that they were not the ones who were to blame when things fell apart,
as they always did, rather than on seeing themselves as the prime-movers in
the process and investing themselves in it with the unqualified understanding
that compromise was the indispensable ingredient of negotiation, and that
without a willingness to compromise there could be no negotiations.
•

Negotiations break down. Indeed, breakdowns are an integral part of the
process. To forestall the unforeseen consequences of such breakdowns,
parties should establish back-channels to each other, one or more members of
their parties who iron out differences with their designated counterparts. I have
already referred to the back channel the ANC and the SAG established after
the breakdown in negotiations in June 1992.

•

Technical Committees are probably the most underestimated but
indispensable tool of the peace process. Technical committees are made up
of experts on the issues that divide parties to the conflict. They are
professional: academics, lawyers, economists, political scientists, and legal
draftsmen. When a negotiating team which has responsibility for a specific or
cluster of issues reach broad agreement on the outlines of a compromise on
an issue, it refers the matter to the technical committee that has been
assembled to assist the negotiating team to find the language that will resolve
their outstanding differences, close the loopholes, add caveats, insert the
necessary amendments, etc.
They take the draft agreement back to the negotiating team who study it to
determine whether it meets its specifications; if not, the team refers the matter
back to the technical committee again with its suggestions and reservations,
and this process of going back and forth, negotiating team to technical
committee and technical committee to negotiating team continues until the
negotiating team is satisfied that all its respective interests and ancillary
concerns are sufficiently addressed. The technical committee searches for the
precise language and takes measure of its nuances to ensure that its
principals' misgivings in the issue under discussion are met.
In a sense the "dispassionate" technical teams are the real negotiators
debating and refining the precise definitions of processes, procedures, and
institutional/ constitutional arrangements that will form the substance of a
settlement.

•

Negotiators must recognize that it may not be possible to reach compromise
on some positions. Thus, they agree that when these occasions arise, they will
employ agreed upon deadlock-breaking mechanisms to resolve the issue. This
may require using parties/people/organizations/individuals/governments who
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are not party to the conflict, but whose neutrality and integrity is acknowledged
by all parties to the conflict.

•

Only win-win settlements work. If one party feels that it has been
outmaneuvered in some particular respect or coerced into making concessions
it otherwise would not have made, the resulting resentment as being perceived
to be the "loser'' will find ways of expressing itself to the detriment of the
settlement.

•

Process is everything. Get the process right and the substance will follow.
Process takes preeminence over substance because without process there will
be no substance. Without a context that provides the fragmentation and
reintegration of the questions that form the core of the substance in a new
way, the substance merely fragments.

•

When one party knows that an issue is "non-negotiable" as far as the other is
concerned, never tum your knowledge of that into a demand that you know the
other cannot meet. Never "force" the other's hand. Besides the resentment it
creates - the fact that one party uses knowledge the other has made it privy to
in the course of confidential exchanges for purposes that would suggest a breach
of confidence smacks of high-risk gamesmanship that undermines the
fundamentals of the process itself.

•

Know thy enemy. Ironically, precisely who "the enemy" was proved difficult for
the South Africans to articulate, but more difficult still for the Northern Irish to
accept - cultural and historical difference and congruencies working at crosspurposes.

· The ANC had always identified the white apartheid regime and the homeland
states - the puppet black states created by the SAG as the foundation blocks
of grand apartheid as the enemy that stood in the way of black liberation. One
of the preconditions it had set before it would negotiate with the government
would have required that all the homelands and the "independent states" be
dismantled and that the "heads" of these states would have no place at the
negotiating table, at least not as the representatives of legal entities. Once
unbanned, the ANC abandoned this demand and began an elaborate process
to "cultivate" the very people it had condemned as "enemies" of the people,
"collaborators" with apartheid. It identified a simple enemy- the white
government that dominated every aspect of South African life. All blacks,
irrespective of whom they have made common cause with prior to the ANC's
unbanning became potential allies, their "sins" forgiven in newly-formed
alliances.
In Northern Ireland, the enemy, especially for republicans, was the British
government and its continued "occupation" of Northern Ireland. There could
only be a "lasting" settlement when Britain recognized the "folly" of its ways or
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were brought to see the folly of them and withdrew. There was a bland
dismissiveness of Protestants and unionism. Protestants were simply seen as
"Brits" with a false sense of national consciousness who would roll over and
passively submit to becoming part of an All-Ireland state, once British
withdrawal made it inevitable.
Only when a series of treaties and agreements between the British and Irish
governments finally convinced the republican movement that the only obstacle
to Irish unity was Protestant opposition to it and that republicans would have to
convince the Protestant community through negotiations that a united Ireland
was in all their interests were republicans finally convinced that "the enemy"
J_hey would have to negotiate the future of Ireland with was not the British
- government and its forces of "occupation," but the Protestant community was
progress possible. Even at this point, it is not absolutely clear that hard-line
republicans accept this reality. 17 Which is why decommissioning will continue
to be a problem.

•

Know thy enemy -literally. In South Africa, the parties sorted this question
out after an initial bout of jousting. When the posturing and put-ons were
discarded, the enemy on either side knew precisely whom they were dealing
with. A question that appears to pose simple questions often raises more
complex ones, once examined in a different context. Who makes the decisions
that count? Who has capacity to deliver? Who has control over the
constituency it purportedly represents? You had the IFP, PAC, DP, and godknows how many homeland and independent state parties. And then you had
the NP government and the ANC. Once the latter two stopped trying to "woo"
Jhe IFP, real negotiations were able to start. In order to shake out the real
sources of authority, you have to begin by being inclusive in every phase of the
process; that having being done you can afford the wheedling that identifies
the principals to be carried along in the flood of events, not the riders of the
flood.
On the Northern Ireland front, such subtle distinctions were never made.
Getting Sinn Fein into the process became the overriding political
consideration. For obvious reasons: without Sinn Fein within the process, there
would be no peace. The mistaken logic was that with Sinn Fein in the process
there would be peace.
When Sinn Fein announced that it did not speak for the IRA, and could not
convince it to decommission, the ingrained genes of Unionist fears began to
reassert themselves. Adding to their apprehensions was the confusion of
tongues over the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein. British Prime
Minister Blair said the two are "inextricably linked" and that Sinn Fein is the
mouthpiece of the IRA. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern agrees that the two
are inextricably linked, but won't go so far as to say that Sinn Fein actually
speaks for the IRA. Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams says a pox on both your
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houses, that Sinn Fein and the IRA are two separate organizations and that
Sinn Fein can make no commitments on behalf of the IRA. The IRA says
nothing, except for the occasional Olympian utterance- that all of this is of no
concern to them. 18 One reason they are not a party to the GFA.
For example, Sinn Fein commits itself in the GFA to the principal of consent?
Have we heard from the IRA on whether it accepts this principle? Sinn Fein
accepts that all arms must be decommissioned? Have we ever heard from the
IRA on this question, other than its ingenuous statements that the British
government begin to disarm itself? Whose judgments do we breathlessly
await? Who are they? To whom are they accountable? And, most importantly,
on whose behalf do they speak? And if we do not know on whose behalf they
speak, the how can we reasonably say on whose behalf do they negotiate?
The process of negotiation, the South African parties told the Northern Ireland
parties, is itself captive to the random nature of events outside the control of
the parties involved but which may, nevertheless, impinge on negotiations and
cause parties to switch gears in order to secure their positions with their own
membership. In short, the key to a negotiation's resulting in a settlement
acceptable to all parties involved in the conflict is creating trust - far easier to
objectify than to achieve, especially since the parties which must establish trust
among themselves must first tear down the barriers of distrust that have
separated them in the past and fueled their conflict. Dismantling barriers of
distrust creates a vacuum; how that vacuum is filled is germane to whether a
propitious climate conducive to negotiations that lead to engagement can
emerge. Negotiation is a necessary condition for engagement, but not a
sufficient one.
•

Trust should not be confused with friendship or with the kind of trust that
builds friendships. "You negotiate with your enemies, not with your friends,"
Mandela said at Arniston. The trust Mandela was speaking about is the
product of shared understandings, belief in the integrity of the other,
acknowledgment that they too are trying to the best of their abilities to come
forward with ways to overcome obstacles and have an equal appreciation of
the futility of a return to violence.
In South Africa, the fact that this trust was established is the real miracle,
especially when one considers the fact that between 1990 and 1994, the
period covering the release of Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment and
the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) until the country's first
nonracial, one person one vote elections, over 4,000 people were the victims
of political violence resulting from the activities, often clandestine, of the
state's security forces, and supporters of both the lnkatha Freedom Party
(IFP) and the ANC. 19
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In the end, the question of having to contemplate the alternatives to a
negotiated settlement is what brought the South Africans and the Northern
Irish together. In the end, it is what the two conflicts had in common: situations
in which neither side could prevail; in which neither side could lose. In
Northern Ireland this point is understood, but not sufficiently understood.
At Arniston, the South African participants were adamant on one thing: Even
when there is an acknowledgment by all parties to a conflict that a negotiated
settlement is the only alternative to continuing internecine violence which will not
secure "victory" for one side or the other, the path to negotiations is an obstacle
course that cannot be traversed in quick and easy steps, but rather one that
throws up unexpected hurdles, one where good intentions often result in
unforeseen consequences, a process that will stall and perhaps fail on occasion,
if the role players fail to establish the necessary trust in each other's legitimate
bone fides, genuine intentions and commitment to a negotiated settlement even
in the face of misgivings and opposition among many in their own constituencies.
In South Africa, the protagonists had to learn this through trial and error, and the
lessons of failure often were bought at a high price. They learned that
expressions of belligerence were often covers for expressions of uncommitted
willingness to talk about talks; that commitments to agreed upon settlements, no
matter how well-intentioned, are often mere gestures of aspirations; that
aspirations cannot be transformed into realities unless the foundations are laid to
build trust among former enemies; that trust is the sine qua non, the one
indispensable ingredient for successful negotiations; that building trust is a long
and arduous process, the crossing of a landscape strewn with political land
mines; that negotiations that lead to settlements require compromises on the part
of all stakeholders and political pain when once-cherished beliefs have to be
abandoned; that settlements should not be confused with resolution; that
resolution only emerges when settlements mature. When the accommodations
that were necessary to achieve a settlement become redundant with the
passage of time, the entrenchment of trust, commitment to shared values,
government that is inclusive and processes of governance that are fully
subscribed to by all former protagonists as being equitable, representative and
non-discriminatory; where differences are commonplace, unencumbered by the
threat of potential conflict.
Paradoxically, the outlines of settlements are usually self-apparent, although
seemingly unattainable, almost always due to the obduracy of protagonists who
will not allow themselves to consider options other than outright victory.
Obsession with embedded questions of identity, righting the perceived wrongs of
history, the legacies of collective memories, ethnicity and religion, of issues
involving the ownership of land scoured with the blood of centuries, the
possession or surrender of which becomes ineluctably intertwined with questions
of nationalism and sovereignty make the self-apparent self-emasculated. 20
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Unfortunately, in divided societies, compromise and surrender are for all practical
purposes one and the same thing. The advocacy of meaningful compromise by
one of the warring parties or parties supporting the same side is a political kiss of
death. Thus, players in conflict situations are prisoners of the constraints forced
on them by considerations of domestic politics. And not unusually, the difficulties
that pose the most serious impediments to negotiations are due more to intragroup rivalries than to inter-group differences.
To be seen as the agent of "selling out" the aspirations of one's group- ethnic,
religious, linguistic, racial or tribal is a more damning fate than to be the
instrument of a fruitless war where the only sure outcome is that nothing will be
settled.
The path from the acknowledgment of the inevitability of negotiations to formal
agreement on negotiation procedures, defining an agenda, implementation of
complex protocols and development of complementary institutional frameworks,
is invariably a long-drawn out process marked by disagreements on joint
declarations on the way forward, endemic distrust papered over during
negotiations, political gamesmanship, and pigheaded recalcitrance.
Trust is a learned behavior. Learning takes time. In South Africa, trust began to
develop only among the main protagonists -- the ANC and sAG - after
negotiations between the two parties had broken down following the Boipatong
massacre in June 1992. 21
Following the breakdown, the SAG and the ANC established a "channel," to
maintain a line of communication between the two, represented on the
government side by its chief negotiator, Roelf Meyer, Minister of Constitutional
Affairs, on the ANC side by its chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary
General of the ANC. The two met on forty-eight occasions between June and
September 1992, resolving outstanding issues between the parties and
developing remarkable empathy for each other's party difficulties, fears,
hesitancies to move forward, and how these issues might be addressed, but
more important, developing a remarkable personal rapport. The result was the
signing of a Record of Understanding between the two parties in September
1992, opening the way for the resumption of talks at the Multi-party Negotiation
Process (MPNP) in February 1993 and culminating in the adoption of an Interim
Constitution in November 1993, and the country's first nonracial election in April
1994.
In the absence of alternatives and the commitment on the part of both the ANC
and the SAG to a negotiated settlement, they made the tough and sometimes
unpalatable compromises that resulted, in their own words, in a "win-win"
situation. Compromise, they both came to understand, was not only a necessity
but the one indispensable ingredient of a successful negotiating process. The
willingness to compromise, they also came to understand, could reveal itself only
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when the parties to the compromise trusted and respected each other. It is a
lesson the Northern Irish understand but have yet to fully absorb.
In the end, Ramaphosa and Meyer were able to imbue their parties, once the
most bitter and implacable of enemies, with the trust they had carefully, if warily,
nurtured. The rest, as they say is history, but not history without pain, detours,
setbacks, and rivers of blood in which the hopes and dreams of many would
drown. But they pushed on because they had to; there was no going back to the
"old" ways. For both blacks and whites the waiting was over.
In the aftermath of the signing of the Record of Understanding, key members of
the SAG and the ANC cemented their relationship at two bosberaad meetings in
December 1992 and January 1993. For four days they lived together, ate and
drank and talked together, and came to a better understanding of one another in
the most casual and unceremonious of circumstances. In four days, they
stepped gingerly, and not without apprehension, across the bridges of three
centuries; the informal ambiance broke down formal barriers; old animosities
were seen in new and less hostile lights; the rigid stereotyping that both sides
had engaged in began to abate and were slowly replaced by a new and
respectful awareness of one another as individuals, which, even if not fully
defined or clearly understood, offered room for rapprochement if not actual
friendship.
In Northern Ireland, the absence of that trust is only now being addressed.
Indeed, the fact that it took the provisional establishment of the power sharing
government by the GFA twenty months to come into being after the parties had
committed themselves to the agreement can be attributed directly to the endemic
distrust Unionists have of Sinn Fein and the IRA.
Even when the UUP agreed to Sinn Fein's taking their seats in the assembly in
September 1997, it would not talk to Sinn Fein directly; hence there were no
head-to-head bilaterals between the two parties that held the future of Northern
Ireland in their hands. They would communicate with Sinn Fein only through
George Mitchell. Indeed, the party leaders, Gerry Adams and David Trimble, did
not shake hands with each other until the GFA was signed. Even then, the
handshake was perfunctory, more for the cameras than for any expression of
mutual goodwill and intent to work together assiduously to steer the agreement
through to harmonious implementation. 22
The failure of the two parties to resolve the impasse over decommissioning and
establishing the Executive, forced the two parties into head-to-head discussions
with each other during Senator George Mitchell's eleven-week review of the
agreement.
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One benefit of the prolonged impasse over decommissioning that cannot be
overestimated is that it finally compelled the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein to
face each other across a negotiating table in bilateral talks.
During the long and intense review process, they had to look each other in the
eye. Had to jawbone. Had to develop skeletal relationships. Had to come to a
better understanding of each other's predicaments. Had to develop human
images of the "other."
After Mitchell made the findings of the review public, Sir Reg Empey, the chief
unionist negotiator, told the media that unionists "recognized the challenges and
difficulties faced by the leadership of Sinn Fein/IRA" -a statement that
heretofore would have been an anathema, heresy that could be exorcised only
with excommunication from the party.
Others were also noting the change in the relations between the two parties.
Indeed, in the week& leading up to the conclusion of the Mitchell Review, the
panaceas heaped on the two parties for their developing understanding of each
other's problems teetered on the obsequious. 23
Mitchell himself commented on the "reluctant camaraderie" that developed, the
ineluctable result of Sinn Fein and the UUP having to work long, intensive days
under sustained pressure and no time-outs.
In the statement accompanying his review of the agreement, Mitchell said:
Not long ago, the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein did not speak [to each other) directly.
In the early weeks of the review, their exchanges were harsh and filled with recrimination.
But gradually, as one of them put it, 'trust crept in' ... and the discussions became serious
and meaningful. 24

Later he went a step further:
The talks had been very tough until the venue moved to the US ambassador's residence
in London. We sat in the ambassador's living room. We shared meals together. I insisted
that there not be any discussion of issues at meals, that we just talk about other things so
that they could come to view each other not as adversaries but as human beings and as
people living in the same place and the same society and wanting the same thing. 25

The bosberaad had come to the Court of St. James'. But whether it has done
any good, other than to make strangers less strange to each other rather than to
foster a camaraderie that remains little more than reluctant, is problematical. But
even that, in the circumstances of the fierce antagonism that exists between
Sinn Fein and the unionists, this was an achievement of considerable import.
In the end, the Mitchell Review did not produce a compromise, merely the
promise of one.
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The mistake worked to the advantage of both the government and the ANC. It
provided De Klerk and his negotiators with more room for maneuver and allowed
them to use the threat of a right-wing backlash to wring concessions from the
ANC, concessions it otherwise would not have been amenable to. It spared the
ANC of having to put every issue to the test of "sufficient consensus," and the
guerrilla "word-fare" the CP would have undoubtedly engaged in with relentless
ferocity to make the process unworkable, the passage of time without anything
being accomplished always working to its advantage. 28
In Northern Ireland, the right wing (DUP) learned assiduously from the mistakes
of the South African right wing. Although it walked out of the assembly when
Sinn Fein was admitted, it never left the process. It learned that once
abandoning a process, your power of control over its direction becomes
nonexistent unless you have a paramilitary capacity to support your withdrawal.
(Sinn Fein always had the support of the IRA; the OUP never had the support of
any Protestant paramilitary organization.)
Once you throw in your hand, you deal yourself out of the game, become a
spectator and watch the remaining players split the residual spoils.
The OUP, despite its commitment to "destroy" the GFA, never did so at the price
of sacrificing the two ministerial positions its numbers entitled it to. Hence, its
participation in the power-sharing Executive- with Sinn Fein- despite its
disavowals that it would never do so. It always understood the difference
between "objection" and 11absentionism" --ironically, something it took Sinn
Fein more than sixty years to learn. 29
In Northern Ireland, negotiations are more complicated than in South Africa,
perhaps because the issues are more amorphous and less amenable to precise
definition. Once Sinn Fein met the conditions for participation in negotiations, the
axis of power shifted: Sinn Fein and the UUP became the key players, if only
because anything that was acceptable to Sinn Fein had to be acceptable to the
SDLP, while the opposite did not hold true. A necessary condition for a peaceful
settlement was Sinn Fein acquiescence to the outcome, even though it
represented a minority of the minority community. But that in itself would have
been insufficient without the UUP's concomitant support.
POST- ARNISTON

Was it a worthwhile endeavor? Did it have an impact on the negotiating process
in Northern Ireland?
The following are brief quotes from the observations Northern Ireland
participants and political commentators imparted to me.
•

"On a distant field of a South Africa game park [David Trimble] began the
journey in earnest from leader of one tribe to the architect of a new
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inclusiveness in Ulster. It was after that trip, according to one close friend "that
he knew common ground could develop between himself and [Seamus]
Mallon." Michael Grove, The Times, 4 July 1998
•

"I [found that] I could learn to love my enemy. We had people there from the
NP, the African National Congress, people from the old South African Defence
Force and many of the other political parties involved in the negotiations. What
I found really interesting about it was that obviously a number of years
previously these people were bitter enemies, and here they were sitting
together. From watching their body language it was clear that many of them
actually liked each other, even loved each other. The message for me was that
if they can do that, we can do that also. No party could remain unaffected by
what they heard and I believe that in the weeks and months ahead we could
possibly see the results of that trip."
Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein chief negotiator, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 19 September 1997

•

"For me the real value of the trip was how the key players handled the
process, how they related to each other, how they overcame difficulties in the
process as they developed."
Jeffrey Donaldson, MP,Uister Unionist Party, 7 January 1999

•

"Each group in South Africa, not each participant in South Africa, felt some
acceptance of their identity in the final outcome. /learnt that the process was
in the ownership of the participants."
Gregory Campbell, Democratic Unionist Party, 7 January 1999

•

"Perhaps the most imporlant message was to people who might be tempted
to jump off [the] negotiating train. That message got through to some vel}'
important people. If you walk out of any process that's the road to ruin and
marginalization."
John, Lord Allardyce, former leader of the Alliance Party, Speaker of the Nl Assembly, 6
January 1999

•

'What we all took away were many lessons about how the South Africans
had handled their process, particularly the confidence-building dimension,
which we hadn't fully appreciated in terms of the extent to which it could go,
the significance of it, and the way in which it was subsequently built into our
negotiating process."
Sean Farren, Senior Negotiator, SDLP, 9 January 1999

•

"It was probably a critical turning point in our negotiations and it happened at
the right time which was gratuitous inasmuch as it couldn't have been planned
to have happened at the critical turning point."
Monica McWilliams, Women's Coalition, 7 January 1999

•

"Listening to the South African negotiators - the generals and the politicians
-was vitally important to us. You had, for example, Mac Maharaj [a senior

ANC operative and key negotiator]. He had the authority to reinvigorate the MK
war. But he was redeployed to defend the peace process. That is very similar
to what happened to the UVF. The UVF had a kitchen cabinet whose job it was
to escalate the war to end the war. But out of their deliberations and their
analysis came an appreciation about things that were going on among
Republicans and they decided it was better to have a look at these things
rather than escalate the war. So there were things that had resonance. The
importance of increased communication between politician and paramilitaries
was something vefY evident when we learned how people like Matthews
Phosa [another key ANC negotiator] were used to ensure that the
communication levels were increased between the militarist and the politician.
All had resonance for us. I think the constitutional Unionist politicians were very
affected by South Africa. Trimble and Robinson were. Robinson's own
admission to me on the way back in the airport at Johannesburg made it very
clear that he found it a very significant journey and a vefY significant
experience. We may not have seen that played out fully in all of his politics but
the level of understanding in the period of transition was vitally important for
people who knew what they would have to do but hadn't got the balls to do it.
Perhaps for them to recognize that you're not alone in this world and that
others have gone through it before you with m·ore stark division and brutality
and pain than we has had an impact."
David Ervine, Progressive Unionist Party, 9 January 1999

•

'We came, we saw, we listened, we learned- and we applied "
Gary McMichael, Ulster Democratic Party, 9 January 1999

•

'The round table seminar in South Africa, away from the media spotlight,
which was attended by representatives of all the parties involved in the
negotiations in Northern Ireland, provided an invaluable forum for face-to-face
discussion between parties and people who found it extremely difficult to meet
on their home ground in Northern Ireland. In facilitating that process of human
interaction, the South African retreat could be described as a precursor to the
type of atmosphere which helped us achieve the breakthrough in the review
carried out under the chairmanship of George Mitchell."
Bertie Ahern, T.D., Irish Prime Minister, South African Institute for International Affairs,
University of the Witwaterstrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 12 January 2000

•

'TAhern] highlighted the round-table discussions between key Irish players,
held in South Africa in 1997, as having heralded a breakthrough. "It was highly
complex, and South Africa went to a lot of expense to assist and show people
what could be achieved, and I know that all politicians without exception who
played a part in that discussion came home believing that this problem [the
Northern Ireland problem] could be cracked in some way. This was no more
than two years before they made the enormous moves that they had not dared
to dream about for the previous sixty to seventy years."
Michael Morris, interview with Bertie Ahern, The Sunday Independent [South Africa],
16 January 2000

SOME POST- ARNISTON OBSERVATIONS

Eleven problems threaten to "throttle" the Northern Ireland peace process with
what are formidable but not insurmountable obstacles: each stands in striking
contrast to the manner in which events unfolded in South Africa.
First, the absence of continuing meaningful contact between the UUP and Sinn
Fein at the highest levels. Without establishing key back channels, without
helping each othe_r to bring their respective recalcitrant communities into line, the
prima facie preconditions for a durable self-sustaining accommodation will
continue to be elusive. The trust that is the sine qua non for such an
accommodation does not exist. Establishing it is a matter of immediate urgency.
Second, the absence of contact between the IRA and party, other than Sinn
Fein, making it impossible to distinguish between Sinn Fein as player and Sinn
Fein as surrogate.
Third, the absence of any strong belief in Northern Ireland that the suspension
of the peace process will eventually result in the collapse of the process, the
belief that somehow the process has become self-sustaining.
Fourth, the absence of a belief that failure will result in some cataclysmic
upheaval, i.e. a blood bath of unfathomable proportions.
Fifth, a propensity to believe that cease-fires that have held for four years will
not become casualties of prolonged stalemates; that there is no going back to
"the bad old days."
Sixth, the sense of false security that repeated last minute "rescue" turnarounds
has induced has engendered a political ennui where people believe that the
protagonists have lost the will to "restart" the conflict.
Seventh, the amorphous yields of the peace "dividend" have dulled memories of
the 30 years of violence, creating a vacuum of will.
Eighth, an unstated but very firmly rooted belief that the process has become
irreversible in the sense that the costs of going backwards are far greater than
the imperceptible gains of going forward.
Ninth, the "millennium" factor- that the last ten years of slaughter in the former
Yugoslavia makes the conflict in Northern Ireland look rather amateurish. As
wars go, Northern Ireland is a Third Division affair, not the stuff of the "big"
leagues. That in the 2000s, it's more about nonsense than about beliefs.
Tenth, national identities are no longer threatened or embraced in the way in
which they were 30 years ago. The parades will go on and we will quarrel
forever. Drumcree is war by other means.
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Eleventh, Decommissioning. In South Africa, the matter was never satisfactorily
dealt with, but in a sense it didn't make any difference. In the final analysis it
would have involved the ANC as liberation movement having to hand over guns
to the ANC as government. In Northern Ireland the question is both qualitatively
and quantitatively different.
CONCLUSIONS

There are none. The failure to resolve the matter of decommissioning resulted in
the institutions of the GFA being suspended on 11 February 2000- in
retrospect an unsurprising outcome, given the way in which the matter was
handled throughout the process. 30
But it was an unfortunate one in the sense that in using legislative means to do
so, the British government "took" ownership of the process away from the parties
in Northern Ireland, thus undermining their need to understand that in the final
analysis it is up to them to negotiate their differences, that only when they
acknowledge this fundamental principle which underpins all successful peace
processes will they empower themselves to reach the necessary but unpalatable
accommodations that will secure the peace.
Enforced coalitions rarely work, and never under circumstances where the
"partners" to power sharing have mutually opposing aspirations - antithetical to
each other in the perpetuation of "us" and "them." South Africa remains an
experiment, Northern Ireland a laboratory test.
We can share our experiences with one another but we cannot replicate them.
Learning from others is no substitute for learning from ourselves. Voices heard
are not voices listened to. In this respect, the Northern Irish have a distance to
travel before they can transmogrify putative trust into purposive risk-taking.
Decommissioning is, as Senator Mitchell insightfully pointed out, symptomatic of
a larger problem: the absence of trust.
And therein, the worm at the core. The worm, however, has many ways of
wriggling.
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UUP side that it would withdraw from government if the IRA had not begun to decommission its
weapons by 12 February 2000. To buttress his position with the Ulster Unionist Council, the
governing body of the UUP, Trimble provided it with a predated letter of resignation as First
Minister. As part of the "interim" arrangement, the IRA agreed to appoint a representative to the
International Body on Decommissioning, under the chairmanship of General John De Chastelain, in
order to facilitate this process. On 5 February 2000, the IRA issued a terse statement that "we
have never entered into any agreement or undertaking or understanding at any time whatsoever on
any aspect of decommissioning." Which is true -it was not a party to the GFA.
On 11 February, De Chastelain issued a second report in which he said that "we find particularly
significant and view as valuable progress the assertion made to us by the IRA representative that
the IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use, in the context of the full
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, and in the context of the removal of the causes
of conflict (my boldface). Which begs the obvious question: Whose causes are we talking about?
On 15 February, in response to the suspension of the GFA institutions, the IRA withdrew its
representative from the De Chastelain Commission. In its statement, the IRA said, "Those who
have made the political process conditional on the decommissioning or silenced IRA guns are
responsible for the current crisis in the peace process."
On 20 February, Peter Mandelson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that the
British government may release a timetable for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern
Ireland. He said the British government wanted to normalise security in the North but added that
any changes must be "in the context of the threat (of violence) going away and politics working."
He told The Observer newspaper: "The idea that the British government want the military to hang
in there and talk tough, irrespective of the political process, is nonsense. We want to normalise
security. There is no pressure to keep more battalions permanently based in Northern Ireland than
are strictly needed for low-key patrolling purposes."
"Withdrawal of British troops" - music to the ears of the IRA. It's what it has been after all along.
See Opsahl Report on Northern Ireland.
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